HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NEW MEXICO,
Fort Bliss, Tex., May 4, 1862.
General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and inspector General, Richmond, Va.
GENERAL: I have the honor to report, for the information of the Secretary of War, the operations of this army during the months of February, March, and April, ultimo:
This report is made to cover the whole campaign, for the reason that the special reports of the various commanders, herewith inclosed, enter sufficiently into detail to elucidate the various actions in which the troops were engaged during the campaign.
It is due to the brave soldiers I have had the honor to command to premise that from its first inception the “Sibley brigade” has encountered difficulties in its organization and opposition and distaste to the service required at its hands which no other troops have met with.
From misunderstandings, accidents, deficiency of arms, &c., instead of reaching the field of its operations early in September, as was anticipated, I found myself at this point as late as the middle of January, 1862, with only two regiments and a half, poorly armed, thinly clad, and almost destitute of blankets. The ranks were becoming daily thinned by those two terrible scourges to an army small-pox and pneumonia. Not a dollar of quartermaster’s funds was on hand or ever had been to supply the daily and pressing necessities of the service, and the small means of this sparse section had been long consumed by the force under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Baylor, so that the credit of the Government was not as available a resource as it might otherwise have been.
Having established a general hospital at Doña Aña, I determined to move forward with the force at hand. Accordingly, during the first week in January [February?], the advance was put in march for old Fort Thorn; thence on the 7th of February the movement was continued to a point 7 miles below Fort Craig, where the Santa Fé papers boasted we were to be met and overwhelmed by Canby’s entire army.
On February 16 a reconnaissance in force was pushed to within a mile of the fort and battle offered on the open plain. The challenge was disregarded, and only noticed by the sending out of a few well-mounted men to watch our movements. The forces of the enemy were kept well concealed in the bosque (or grove) above the fort and within its walls.
The reconnaissance proved the futility of assaulting the fort in front with our light metal, and that our only hope of success was to force the enemy to an open-field fight. It was accordingly determined by a partial retrograde movement to cross the Rio Grande to the east bank, turn the fort, and force a battle for the recrossing. To do this involved, first, the hazardous necessity of crossing a treacherous stream in full view of the fort-second, to make a “dry camp” immediately opposite and remote from the fort, only a mile and a half, and the next day to fight our first battle. The enemy seemed to have been so confounded by the boldness and eccentricity of these movements that the first was accomplished without molestation, save a demonstration on the afternoon of the 20th, as we were forming our camp by the crossing, of some 2,500 infantry and cavalry, with the purpose apparently of making an assault upon our lines. Here the spirit and courage of our men were evidenced by the alacrity shown in getting into line to confront the enemy. A few rounds from our well-directed guns, under the management of Captain Teel, Lieutenants Riley and Woods, checked his advance and drove him to the cover of his sand-revetted mud walls.
It is proper to state here that these operations, approved by me, were conducted by Col. Thomas Green, of the Fifth Regiment, the state of my health having confined me to the ambulance for several days previous.
On the morning of the 21st, considering that the impending battle must decide the question at issue, though still very weak, I took the saddle at early dawn to direct in person the movement. Green’s regiment with a battalion of the Seventh, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton, and Captain Teel’s battery, were ordered to make a strong, threatening demonstration on the fort, while Scurry, with the Fourth, well flanked by Pyron’s command on the left, should feel his way cautiously to the river.
This movement was unfortunately delayed by the loss during the night, by careless herding, of 100 mules of the baggage train of the Fourth Regiment. Rather than the plan should be defeated a number of wagons were abandoned, containing the entire kits, blankets, books, and papers of this regiment, and, meanwhile, what was left of the trains was kept in motion over the sand hills, which the enemy had deemed impossible.
On reaching the river bottom at Valverde it was ascertained that the enemy, anticipating our movement, had thrown a large force of infantry and cavalry up the river to dispute the water with us. Pyron immediately engaged him with his small force of 250 men, and gallantly held his ground against overwhelming odds until the arrival of Scurry with the Fourth Regiment and Lieutenant Riley’s battery of light howitzers.
At 12 m., the action becoming warm and the enemy evidently receiving large re-enforcements, I ordered Green’s regiment and Teel’s battery to the front. These in the course of an hour gallantly entered into action and the battle became general. Subsequently Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton, with his battalion, was ordered forward from the rear and did right good service, leading his men even to the cannon’s mouth.
At 1.30 p.m., having become completely exhausted, and finding myself no longer able to keep the saddle, I sent my aides and other staff officers to report to Colonel Green. His official report attests the gallantry of their bearing and his final success, resulting in the capture of their battery and driving the enemy in disorder from the field, and thus evidencing his own intrepidity and the indomitable courage of all engaged.
From information derived from reliable sources, the forces opposed to us could not have been less than 5,000 men, with a reserve of 3,000 at the fort. Ours did not exceed 1,750 on the field, viz: the Fourth Regiment, 600; Fifth, 600; Seventh, 300; and Pyron’s command (of Second Mounted Regiment Rifles), 250. This signal victory should have resulted in the capture of the fort, as fresh troops had been brought forward to pursue and follow the discomfited column of the enemy. A flag of truce was opportunely dispatched by the Federal commander before he reached the gates of his fort, and which was for two hours supposed by our troops to be a proposition to surrender.
This flag had for its object the burying of the dead and removal of their wounded; and I regret to state here, for the sake of old associations, that under this flag and another sent next day, the enemy, availing himself of our generosity and confidence in his honor, not only loaded his wagons with arms picked up on the battle-field, but sent a force up and actually succeeded in recovering from the river one 24-pounder which had been left in our hands. Even a guidon and a flag, taken in the same way, under the cover of night, and a white flag were boastingly pointed to, in an interview under a flag of truce between one of my aides and the Federal commander at the fort, as trophies of the fight.
The burying of the dead and care of the wounded occasioned a delay of two days on the field, thus leaving us with but five days’ scant rations. In this dilemma the question arose whether to assault the fort in this crippled condition or move rapidly forward up the river, where supplies of breadstuffs and meat could be procured. The latter course, in a council of war, was adopted.
Depositing our sick at Socorro, 30 miles above Fort Craig, the march was uninterruptedly made to Albuquerque, where, notwithstanding the destruction by the enemy of large supplies by fire, ample subsistence was secured. A very considerable quantity of supplies and ammunition was also obtained at Cubero, a temporary post 60 miles west of Albuquerque. Other supplies were also taken at Santa Fé, and upon the whole we had a sufficiency for some three months.
It is due to the Fourth Regiment to mention at this place an action of devotion and self-sacrifice worthy of high praise, and the more commendable because they are Texans.
In the action at Valverde many of their horses were killed, thus leaving them half foot and half mounted. The proposition being made to them to dismount the whole regiment, without a dissenting voice, a cavalry regiment, which had proudly flaunted its banner before the enemy on the 20th, took the line of march on the 24th a strong and reliable regiment of infantry.
Having secured all the available stores in and about Albuquerque and dispatched Maj. Charles L. Pyron with his command to Santa Fé to secure such as might be found there,I determined to make a strong demonstration on Fort Union.
With this view Col. William R. Scurry, with The Fourth and the battalion of Colonel Steele’s regiment, under Maj. Powhatan Jordan, was pushed forward in the direction of Gallisteo, while Colonel Green, with his regiment (Fifth), being somewhat crippled in transportation, was held for a few days in hand to check any movement from Fort Craig.
Meanwhile the enemy (having received re-enforcements at Fort Union of 950 men from Pike’s Peak, on or about March 12) took the initiative and commenced a rapid march on Santa Fé.
Major Pyron, re-enforced by four companies of the Fifth Regiment, under Major Shropshire, receiving notice of this movement, advanced at once to meet him on the high road between Santa Fé and Fort Union.
On March 26th a sharp skirmish ensued, described in detail by that officer, wherein many acts of daring heroism were enacted. The company of “Brigandes” (independent volunteers), under the command of Capt. John Phillips, is said to have done good service. One of their number. Mr. Thomas Cator, was killed and 2 wounded. On this occasion, as on every previous one, this company showed a devotedness to the cause which has elevated them and inspired confidence throughout the army. Colonel Scurry reached the scene of action at daylight next morning, and the next day fought the battle of Glorieta, driving the enemy from the field with great loss.
His report is respectfully referred to for the details of this glorious action. Pending this action I was on my route to Santa Fé, in rear of Green’s regiment, which had, meanwhile, been put in march for that place, where, on my arrival, I found the whole exultant army assembled. The sick and wounded had been comfortably quartered and attended; the loss of clothing and transportation had been made up from the enemy’s stores and confiscations, and, indeed, everything done which should have been done.
Many friends were found in Santa Fé who had been in durance. Among the rest General William Pelham, who had but recently been released from a dungeon in Fort Union.
After the occupancy of the capital of the Territory for nearly a month from the time of our first advance upon it, the forage and supplies obtainable there having become exhausted, it was determined to occupy, with the whole army, the village of Manzano, intermediate between Fort Union, Albuquerque, and Fort Craig, and securing as a line of communication the road to Fort Stanton.
This plan was disconcerted, however, by the rapid and continuous expresses from Albuquerque, urging the necessity of re-enforcements to hold the place (the depot of all our supplies) against the advancing forces of Canby from Fort Craig.
The entire force was accordingly moved by forced marches in the direction of Albuquerque, arriving-too late to encounter the enemy, but time enough to secure our limited supplies from the contingency of capture.
In our straightened circumstances the question now arose in my mind whether to evacuate the country or take the desperate chances of fighting the enemy in his stronghold (Union), for scant rations at the best. The course adopted was deemed the wisest.
On the morning of April 12 the evacuation commenced by the crossing of Scurry’s (Fourth) regiment, the battalion of Steele’s regiment, Pyron’s command, and a part of the artillery, by ferry and ford, to the west bank of the river, Green’s regiment was ordered to follow; but finding the ford to be difficult, he encamped for the night-on the east bank, hoping to be able on the ensuing morning to find a better ford lower down the river.
Accordingly on the next day that officer proceeded with his regiment as low down as Peralta, opposite Los Lunas, the point at which I had halted the balance of the army to await his arrival.
In the mean time Canby, having formed a junction with a large force from Fort Union, debouched through a cañon after night-fall to the neighborhood of the river, taking a commanding position in close proximity to Green’s camp, and in the morning opened a furious, but harmless, cannonade.
On being notified of the critical situation of this detached portion of the army the whole disposable force at Los Lunas, reserving a sufficient guard for the train, was dispatched to its relief. The passage of the river by this force and the artillery was successfully effected, under the direction of Colonel Scurry.
Following shortly after with a portion of my staff to assume the immediate command, and having crossed the river. I was notified by several officers who had preceded me some hundred yards of the rapid approach of a large number of the enemy’s cavalry. Finding myself completely Cut off, I had no other alternative than to recross the river amid a shower of balls. The day was occupied at Peralta in ineffectual firing on both sides.
After night-fall I gave orders for the recrossing of the whole army to the west bank of the river, which was effected without interruption or casualty, and on the next morning the march down the river was resumed. The enemy followed on the opposite bank, and both armies encamped in full view of each other, the river alone intervening.
The transportation and artillery had by this time become such an incumbrance on the heavy, sandy road, without forage or grass, that the abandonment of one or the other became inevitable. My original plan had been to push on by the river route in advance of the enemy having the start of him two whole days from Albuquerque to Fort Craig, attack the weak garrison, and demolish the fort. This plan was defeated by Colonel Green not finding a crossing of the river at a convenient point.
Colonels Green and Scurry, with several other practical officers, here {p.511}came forward and proposed, in order to avoid the contingency of another general action in our then crippled condition, that a route through the mountains, avoiding Fort Craig and striking the river below that point, should be pursued, they undertaking with their respective commands to push the artillery through at all hazards and at any expenditure of toil and labor. Maj. Bethel Coopwood, who had familiarized himself with the country, undertook the difficult and responsible task of guiding the army through this mountainous, trackless waste.
The arguments presented in favor of this course were potent. Besides having the advantage of grass and a firm road, with very little difference in distance, the enemy would be completely mystified, as afterwards proved to be the case. Accordingly, all the wagons which could possibly be dispensed with were ordered to be abandoned on the ground, seven days’ provisions to be packed on mules, and the entire force put in march after night-fall. The route was a difficult and most hazardous one, both in respect to its practicability and supply of water. The successful accomplishment of the march not only proved the sagacity of our guide, but the pledge of Colonel Scurry that the guns should be put over every obstacle, however formidable, by his regiment, was nobly fulfilled. Not a murmur escaped the lips of these brave boys. Descents into and ascents out of the deepest cañons, which a single horseman would have sought for miles to avoid, were undertaken and accomplished with a cheerfulness and ability which were the admiration and praise of the whole army. Thus in ten days, with seven days’ rations, a point on the river where supplies had been ordered forward was reached. The river, which was rising rapidly, was safely crossed to the east bank, under the direction of Colonel Green, and at this moment, I am happy to repeat, the whole force is comfortably quartered in the villages extending from Doña Aña to this place.
My chief regret in making this retrograde movement was the necessity of leaving hospitals at Santa Fé, Albuquerque, and Socorro. Everything, however, was provided for the comfort of the sick, and sufficient funds, in Confederate paper, provided them to meet every want, if it be negotiated. It has been almost impossible to procure specie upon any terms. One thousand dollars is all I have been able to procure for the use of hospitals and for secret service. The ricos, or wealthy citizens of New Mexico, had been completely drained by the Federal powers, and, adhering to them, had become absolute followers of their army for dear life and their invested dollars. Politically they have no distinct sentiment or opinion on the vital question at issue. Power and interest alone control the expression of their sympathies. Two noble and notable exceptions to this rule were found in the brothers Rafael and Manuel Armijo, the wealthiest and most respectable native merchants of New Mexico. The latter had been pressed into the militia, and was compulsorily present in the action at Valverde. On our arrival at Albuquerque they came forward boldly and protested their sympathy with our cause, placing their stores, containing goods amounting to $200,000, at the disposal of my troops.
When the necessity for evacuating the country became inevitable, these two gentlemen abandoned luxurious homes and well-filled storehouses to join their fate to the Southern Confederacy. I trust they will not be forgotten in the final settlement.
In concluding this report, already extended beyond my anticipations, it is proper that I should express the conviction, determined by some experience, that, except for its political geographical position, the Territory of New Mexico is not worth a quarter of the blood and treasure expended in its conquest. As a field of military operations it possesses not a single element, except in the multiplicity of its defensible positions. The indispensable element, food, cannot be relied on. During the last year, and pending the recent operations, hundreds of thousands of sheep have been driven off by the Navajoes. Indeed, such were the complaints of the people in this respect that I had determined, as good policy, to encourage private enterprises against that tribe and the Apaches, and to legalize the enslaving of them.
As for the results of the campaign, I have only to say that we have beaten the enemy in every encounter and against large odds; that from being the worst armed my forces are now the best armed in the country. We reached this point last winter in rags and blanketless. The army is now well clad and well supplied in other respects. The entire campaign has been prosecuted without a dollar in the quartermaster’s department, Captain Harrison not having yet reached this place. But, sir, I cannot speak encouragingly for the future, my troops having manifested a dogged, irreconcilable detestation of the country and the people. They have endured much, suffered much, and cheerfully; but the prevailing discontent, backed up by the distinguished valor displayed on every field, entitles them to marked consideration and indulgence.
These considerations, in connection with the scant supply of provisions and the disposition of our own citizens in this section to depreciate our currency, may determine me, without waiting for instructions, to move by slow marches down the country, both for the purpose of remounting and recruiting our thinned ranks.
Trusting that the management of this more than difficult campaign, intrusted to me by the Government, may prove satisfactory to the President, I have the honor, general, to be, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY, Brigadier-General, Commanding.